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INTRODUCTION

Securities law has emerged as an area of law not typically associated with traditional public environmental law.1 However, securities law has begun to permeate into environmental law.2 As the
catastrophic physical and financial effects of climate change become more apparent every day, shareholders and institutional investors have demanded that publicly traded companies analyze
and address the risks and opportunities associated with climate
change and disclose them in their annual filings.3 These demands
have only increased with the release of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report, which warned of the catastrophic effects associated with a 1.5 degrees Celsius rise in global
temperature.4 Many countries have begun encouraging, or even requiring, climate-related disclosures; many organizations have begun to voluntarily disclose their risks.5 Although climate-related
issues can be viewed as a material issue that triggers disclosure,
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
has been lax with regulation and enforcement of mandatory
See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71
STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (discussing how anti-trust, bankruptcy, corporate,
and securities laws are the areas that roadblock environmental progress).
2 Id. at 165–71
3 Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 284 (2009); see generally California Public Employees’ Retirement System et al., Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate
Risk Disclosure 6 (Sept. 18, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf [https://perma.cc/83F5-BDJV] [hereinafter California
Petition].
4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 4 (2018) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT].
5 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES (TCFD), 2018
STATUS
REPORT
i
(2018),
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/FINAL-2018-TCFD-Status-Report-092518.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8XSR-9ST6].
1
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reporting as it relates to climate change.6 As one of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters,7 the United States (“U.S.”) must take
steps to address emissions concerns. In addition to companies voluntarily taking action against climate change, government action
will play a vital role as the world transitions to a low-carbon economy.8
This Note argues that new legislation calling for mandatory
reporting on climate-related risks and opportunities – aligned with
the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”)
Recommendations – is required to fill the informational gap that is
hindering the transition to a low-carbon economy. Part II provides
a history of financial disclosures and how climate change has been
interpreted under current law. Part III discusses the current and
expected financial consequences arising from physical climate
risks and global action, and provides an overview of the ways institutional investors can make a significant impact on the shift to
a low-carbon economy. Part IV provides an overview of the TCFD
and their Recommendations.9 Part V discusses why climate-related financial disclosures have failed thus far – namely, by only
having an interpretive rule, which does not carry the “force of law,”
clarify mandatory reporting requirements as it relates to climaterelated information.
Part VI recommends that Congress pass new legislation requiring mandatory climate-related financial disclosures aligned
with the TCFD Recommendations, using the body of the Climate
6 See David Gelles, S.E.C. is Criticized for Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk
Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/business/energy-environment/sec-is-criticized-for-lax-enforcement-of-climate-riskdisclosure.html [https://perma.cc/CF6E-Y7BB].
7 Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data
[https://perma.cc/E669-6MYB].
8 See Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (Jan.
14, 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceoletter [https://perma.cc/MH7N-WZP3]. (“Over the next few years, one of the most
important questions we will face is the scale and scope of government action on
climate change, which will generally define the speed with which we move to a
low-carbon economy.”) [hereinafter Letter from Larry Fink].
9 TCFD, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES iii–v (June 29, 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2BA-3EFE] [hereinafter TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS]; see infra
Part IV.
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Risk Disclosure Act of 2019 (“CRDA”)10 as a starting point. The
TCFD Recommendations should be adopted because other countries and organizations have already expressed their support for
the Recommendations.11 This new legislation will allow U.S. regulators to take control of climate-related disclosures for the U.S. capital markets before other jurisdictions can impose disclosure regimes on U.S. issuers and investors. Support from the U.S. will
also encourage more nations and businesses to support the Recommendations. Furthermore, new legislation is better than a regulation or another interpretive rule because of potential presidential
influence on the SEC.12 The CRDA does not go far enough because
it primarily focuses on the climate risks companies are exposed to
and how those companies intend to manage those risks. The Act
fails to fully account for the opportunities a company may gain
from the resulting market changes caused by climate change, such
as entry into new markets, creation of new products and technologies, and less energy consumed by fossil-fuel sources during business operations through the adoption of renewable energy.
Part VII provides three administrative alternatives that
achieve similar results to passing new legislation: (1) use a more
forceful interpretation of current securities law, then translated
into a new interpretive rule, to clarify existing climate-related disclosure obligations, (2) amend Regulation S-K, and (3) promulgate
a new regulation. The SEC stated in its 2010 Climate Guidance
that disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities is

10 The bill has been introduced in both chambers of Congress. S. 2075, 116th
Cong. (2019); H.R. 3623, 116th Cong. (2019).
11 TCFD, 2019 STATUS REPORT 110 (2019), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-TCFD-Status-Report-FINAL-053119.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WZ5F-9FUR] [hereinafter 2019 STATUS REPORT].
12 Although there is a long-held understanding that the SEC is an independent agency and its Commissioners enjoy removal protection, its independence has
never been fully established. The Exchange Act is silent on the question of Commissioner removal and the Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board., 561 U.S. 477 (2010), sidestepped the question by deciding the
case using the parties’ stipulation that SEC Commissioners enjoy removal protection. See Note, The SEC is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARV. L. REV. 781,
781–82 (2013). Because this question has not been answered, legislation is the
better implementing tool for climate-related financial disclosures, rather than
regulation, because of the partisan politicking surrounding the issue of climate
change.
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already mandated under current law;13 however, the SEC did not
interpret and clarify current laws as forcefully as it should have
when it released the Guidance. This conclusion is supported by the
purpose of the Securities Act, accompanying regulations, and the
fact that many investors state that climate-related risks and opportunities are material. New guidance, in addition to further and
more forcefully clarifying existing reporting requirements, would
give management less discretion when determining what risks and
opportunities are material to their company. Amending Regulation
S-K or promulgating a new regulation are both feasible options but
will take time to complete because it requires compliance with notice and comment rulemaking. This Note concludes that full disclosure of both climate-related risks and opportunities is essential to
providing investors with the necessary information required to finance our future’s health and to ensure a swift transition to a lowcarbon economy. This is best achieved by new climate risk legislation that aligns with the TCFD Recommendations.
II.

HISTORY AND CURRENT CLIMATE RISK
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Disclosure requirements are primarily regulated by two acts:
(1) the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”);14 and (2) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).15 The SEC has determined, that when enacting the Securities Act, “Congress recognized that investors must have access to accurate information
important to making investment and voting decisions in order for
the financial markets to function effectively.”16 The Securities Act
does not set out specific disclosure requirements; rather, Section 7
of the Act gives the SEC full authority to determine what information issuers must submit, stating that “[t]he Commission shall
adopt regulations under this subsection requiring each issuer of an
13 See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING
DISCLOSURE
RELATED
TO
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
11–12
(2010),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XLF-56XW]
[hereinafter 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE].
14 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2018).
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–qq (2018).
16 Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed.
Reg. 23,916, 23,921 (Apr. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 201, 229, 230,
232, 239, 240 and 249) [hereinafter 2016 Concept Release].
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asset-backed security to disclose, for each tranche or class of security, information regarding the assets backing that security.”17 The
Exchange Act created the SEC – whose mission is to “protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate
capital formation”18 – and empowers the SEC to require periodic
reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securities.19 The reports are either annual (Form 10-K), quarterly (Form
10-Q), or on a current basis when a number of specified events occur.20 Regulation S-X21 and Regulation S-K22 outline the forms
most often used when a registrant is required to file a disclosure
form with the SEC. Regulation S-X defines the form, content, and
requirements for financial disclosures.23 Regulation S-K provides
instructions for filing forms.24
Despite neither regulation expressly requiring climate disclosures, the SEC requires, for both registration (Rule 408) and reporting (Rule 12b-20), that, in addition to information expressly
required by regulation, the disclosure of “such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading.”25 The term “material” has caused much confusion
since it was first introduced into federal securities law in 1933. Although still vague and ambiguous, it can be defined as a trigger for
when there is a legal obligation to disclose facts or information.26
To clear confusion around the term (although to little or no avail),
the Supreme Court, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., held
that, for facts or information to be considered “material,” “there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(1).
About
the
SEC,
SECURITIES
&
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/CR8D-6KTD].
19 15 U.S.C. § 78m; See, e.g., Form 8-K, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html
[https://perma.cc/TT6Z-DV6X].
20 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
21 See generally 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2020).
22 See generally id. pt. 229.
23 Id. § 210.1–01(a).
24 Id. § 229.10(a).
25 Id. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20.
26 Dale Oesterle, The Overused and Under-defined Notion of “Material” in
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 167 (2011).
17
18
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altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” This definition applies to Section 14 of the Exchange Act (in the proxy-solicitation context).27 The SEC then adopted this reasonable investor
standard in its 1982 amendments to the regulatory definition of
“material” in Rules 408 and 12b-20.28 Six years later, in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, the issue of materiality in federal securities law returned to the Supreme Court, this time for application to Section
10 of the Exchange Act.29 The Court chose to adopt the reasonable
investor standard from TSC Industries.30 The reason the Court had
to define “material” for these two Sections is because the SEC does
not include a definition for “material” in those accompanying regulations.31
The confusion surrounding “material” has continued since the
Court attempted to shed light on the term, and the term particularly sparks confusion when applied to climate-related issues. Investor groups, curious about how climate change affects the businesses in which they have invested, have been calling for voluntary
disclosure of companies’ environmental policies since the 1990s.32
In 2007, a consortium of environmental groups, institutional investors, and state officials – believing that climate change is a material issue and should be disclosed33 – petitioned the SEC to release
guidance on how climate-related issues are interpreted under existing mandatory disclosure rules and regulations.34 This call was
answered in 2010 when the SEC issued an interpretive release
providing guidance on the subject.35 The SEC interpreted four nonfinancial statement provisions within Regulation S-K that could
426 U.S. 428, 449 (1976).
“The term ‘material,’ when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing
of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach
importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2. The definition in Rule 405 is practically identical. See id. §
230.405. For the 1982 amendments, see Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,436 (Mar. 16, 1982) (for Rule 405), and see id. at
11,465 (for Rule 12b-2).
29 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
30 Id. at 232.
31 See 17 C.F.R §§ 240.10b-1 to -21, 240.14a-1 to -21.
32 McFarland, supra note 3, at 284.
33 California Petition, supra note 3, at 6.
34 McFarland, supra note 3, at 284.
35 See generally 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13.
27
28
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trigger climate-related disclosures: Item 101, “Description of Business,” which requires disclosure of compliance with federal, state,
and local provisions that relate to the protection of the environment and have a material effect on capital expenditures, earnings,
and competitive position36; Item 103, “Legal Proceedings,” which
requires disclosure of any material pending legal proceedings to
which the company, any of its subsidiaries, or its property, is a
party);37 Item 303, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis,”
which requires disclosure of known trends, events, demands, commitments, and uncertainties reasonably likely to have a material
effect on financial condition or operating performance38; and Item
505(c), “Risk Factors,” which requires “a discussion of the most significant factors that make an investment speculative or risky.”39
Items 101 and 103 require express disclosure of compliance with,
and litigation arising from, environmental law, whereas Items 303
and 505(c) leave it to management to determine how environmental issues are implicated.
After stating what four Items could trigger a climate-related
disclosure obligation, the 2010 Guidance focused on four business
factors management should consider. The first is the impact of legislation and regulation.40 This requires a company to determine the
likelihood that a legislative or regulatory body will enact climaterelated laws, and, if so, whether those laws will have a material
effect on the company’s operations or financial condition.41 The second are the impacts from treaties or international accords.42 This
requires a company to determine the effect of international agreements, such as the Paris Agreement or EU Emissions Trading System.43 The third factor involves the indirect consequences of

17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
Id. § 229.103.
38 Id. § 229.303.
39 Id. § 229.503(c).
40 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 22–24.
41 FATIMA MARIA AHMAD, BEYOND THE HORIZON: CORPORATE REPORTING ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2017), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/09/beyond-horizon-corporate-reporting-climate-change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75YHG3UR]. An example of an act triggering climate disclosures under this provision
of the 2010 Climate Guidance would be the Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018.
See, e.g., Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018, S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018).
42 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 24.
43 AHMAD, supra note 41, at 5.
36
37
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regulation or business trends.44 This could include demand-side effects of legal, technological, political, and scientific developments
regarding climate change, as well as reputational impacts.45 The
fourth are the physical impacts of climate change.46 This focuses
on the effects climate change has on a company’s operations and
performance, such as impacts from increased weather severity,
sea-level rise, and water availability and quality.47 In the 2010 Climate Guidance, the SEC also recognized that, because the Exchange Act is designed to protect investors and disclosure is within
management’s discretion, doubts as to materiality should be resolved in favor of the investors.48
Although this interpretative guidance seemed to signal a
much-needed change in the financial disclosure realm, minimal
improvements were made. In 2014, Ceres,49 a sustainability focused non-governmental organization (“NGO”), released a report
which found that the SEC was not prioritizing the financial risks
and opportunities of climate change and showed a lack of commitment to the 2010 Guidance when issuing comment letters.50 Similar to the events that led to the SEC releasing the 2010 Climate
Guidance, proponents of improved requirements and enforcement
began sending letters to the SEC, calling for “greater scrutiny of
climate-related disclosures.”51 In response, the SEC issued a Concept Release on “Business and Financial Disclosure Required by
Regulation S-K,” which sought public comments on whether the
2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 25–26.
AHMAD, supra note 41, at 5–6.
46 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 26–27.
47 Id. at 26–27.
48 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 11 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 428, 448 (1976)).
49 “Ceres is a sustainability nonprofit organization working with the most influential investors and companies to build leadership and drive solutions throughout the economy. Through powerful networks and advocacy, Ceres tackles the
world’s biggest sustainability challenges, including climate change, water scarcity
and pollution, and inequitable workplaces.” About Us, CERES (last visited Apr. 24,
2020), https://www.ceres.org/about-us.
50 See JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC &
CORPORATE
CLIMATE
CHANGE
REPORTING,
4,
25–27
(2014),
https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/cool-response-sec-corporate-climatechange-reporting?report=view [https://perma.cc/4D2Z-QB8N].
51 These proponents included shareholders and lawmakers, comprised of an
alliance of sixty-two institutional investors, New York City and New York State
comptrollers, and thirty-five members of Congress. Gelles, supra note 6.
44
45
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SEC should consider sustainability-related line-item disclosure, as
well as materiality standards for sustainability issues.52 The SEC
received comments from various NGOs and investor groups advocating for mandatory reporting requirements and increased enforcement, as well as from industry groups opposed to having further regulation on climate risk disclosure.53 Although the current
SEC Chair, Jay Clayton, expressed support for the 2010 Climate
Guidance during his Senate confirmation hearing,54 no action has
been taken since receiving the public comments.55 Furthermore,
since the 2010 Climate Guidance was issued, Republican Congressman Bill Posey has spearheaded efforts opposing the guidance and other climate change regulation. For example, in an appropriations bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in
July 2016, Congressman Posey introduced an amendment that
prohibits the SEC from using funds provided by the bill to administer, enforce, or codify into regulation, specified guidance for public companies regarding disclosures related to climate change.56
52 2016 Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,916; Natalie Nowiski, Rising
Above the Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Relevance
to the Energy Sector, 39 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8 (2018).
53 Nowiski, supra note 52, at 8–9. The arguments by industry groups included
that: “(1) environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues were sufficiently addressed in the 2010 Guidelines; (2) the SEC lacked authority to require such disclosures; (3) materiality in the context of fiduciary duties only could extend to
financial interests; (4) further regulation would unfairly burden reporting entities; and (5) the disclosure of such information would be advantageous to competitors.” Id.
54 Linda M. Lowson, Global Climate Change and Sustainability Financial Reporting: An Unstoppable Force with or without Trump, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Apr. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/30/globalclimate-change-and-sustainability-financial-reporting-an-unstoppable-forcewith-or-without-trump/ [https://perma.cc/ECK6-4N3C].
55 In January 2020, the SEC released a proposed rule for aimed at modernizing Regulation S-K. Management’s Discussion and Analysis, Selected Financial
Data, and Supplementary Financial Information, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,068 (proposed
Feb. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 239, 240, and 249) (2020).
However, these proposed amendments made no attempt to “address investors’
needs for standardized disclosure on climate change risk. Public Statement, Allison Herren Lee, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the
Room (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-202001-30 [https://perma.cc/8QMA-2YFC].
56 H. Amendment 1261 to H.R. 5485, 114th Cong. (2016); see Alex Kotch &
David Sirota, Despite Irma, Florida Congressman Aims to Let Companies Hide
BUS.
TIMES
(Sept.
11,
2017),
Climate-Change
Risks,
INT’L
https://www.ibtimes.com/political-capital/despite-irma-florida-congressmanaims-let-companies-hide-climate-change-risks [https://perma.cc/7X8X-UH8X].
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The SEC’s lack of commitment to, and the effects of Congressman Posey’s opposition efforts to, the 2010 Guidance are reflected
in a February 2018 report by the Government Accountability Office.57 The report highlights multiple constraints that the SEC
faces in reviewing climate-related disclosures. One constraint is
that the SEC does not always have access to the information companies use to support what they consider to be climate-related
risks in their businesses and the information those companies rely
on in determining materiality.58 Another constraint is that disclosures vary in format and specificity.59 The report notes that the
SEC has mechanisms, tools, and resources to help its staff consistently review filing disclosures, including internal supervisory control testing, two-level review process, regulations and guidance, internal and external data, and staff training.60 However, with
respect to internal supervisory control testing and staff training,
senior staff members have neither conducted review specific to climate-related disclosures nor had training focused on the (1) materiality of climate-related issues, (2) industry-specific climate-related disclosures, and (3) general climate-related disclosures.61
With the SEC not committed to its interpretation in the 2010
Guidance, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, in September 2010,
sought to bring climate-related financial disclosures back to headlines by introducing the “Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018.”62
The Act directed:

57 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-188, CLIMATERELATED RISKS: SEC HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
(2018) [hereinafter CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS]. The GAO released another report in March 2019, discussing a lack of leadership from the White House
on managing climate risks, the need for the federal government to develop a comprehensive plan to manage climate change, and that information on climate risks
is urgently needed. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK
SERIES: SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGHRISK AREAS 110–22 (2019).
58 CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 57, at 16–17.
59 Some companies report their climate-related disclosures in the business
description section of its filing, while others may disclose a similar item in the
risk factors section. This makes it difficult for SEC reviewers to compare companies within the same industry. Id. at 18–19.
60 Id. at 20–24.
61 Id. at 21, 23.
62 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018, S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018).

11

426

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

the SEC, in consultation with climate experts at other federal
agencies, to issue rules within one year that require every public
company to disclose: [i]ts direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions[;] [t]he total amount of fossil-fuel related assets that it owns
or manages[;] [h]ow its valuation would be affected if climate
change continues at its current pace or if policymakers successfully restrict greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Paris accord
goal [;] [i]ts risk management strategies related to the physical
risks and transition risks posed by climate change.63

The Act also directed the SEC to create specific disclosure requirements for different industries, with additional disclosure requirements imposed on fossil fuel companies.64 Senator Warren’s bill did
not get movement at the end of 2018, and died with the 115th Congress.65
The Bill, however, was revived when Senator Warren reintroduced the bill to the 116th Congress as the “Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019.”66 The latest action on this Bill occurred on July
10, 2019, when it was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.67 U.S. Representative Sean Casten also introduced a companion bill in the House.68 The latest action on the
63 Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Colleagues Unveil Bill to Require Every Pub. Co. to Disclose Climate-Related Risks (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-colleagues-unveil-bill-to-require-every-public-company-to-disclose-climate-related-risks
[https://perma.cc/5C2D-82V4].
64 Id.
65 A bill becomes “dead” when it has not made it through the entire legislative
process and signed into law by the end of the two-year Congressional cycle. Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/legfaq.aspx, [https://perma.cc/42H8-6K3V] (referencing FAQ #11). The CRDA
did not make it past its referral committee. See S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3481/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/YDX4-ZYPY] (providing tracking information for the bill).
66 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. (2019); Press
Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator Warren, Representative Casten Lead Colleagues Introducing a Bill to Require Every Pub. Co. to Disclose Climate-Related
Risks (July 10, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-representative-casten-lead-colleagues-introducing-a-billto-require-every-public-company-to-disclose-climate-related-risks
[https://perma.cc/G472-BUYA] [hereinafter Warren 2019 Press Release].
67 S. 2075, 116th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/2075/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/8T4Z-453V] (see link for bill
tracking information).
68 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, H.R. 3623, 116th Cong. (2019).
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companion bill occurred on July 16, 2019, when it was ordered to
be reported (amended).69 The reintroduced Bill is substantively the
same as the previous version.70 Despite this reintroduction, passage of a progressive climate bill is a long shot under the current
political gridlock, although Republicans who once doubted climate
change are now beginning to support mitigation efforts.71
III.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ROLE OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

A. The Financial Impact of Climate Change
Many organizations are aware of the traditional implications
of climate change (i.e., extreme weather, sea level rise, drought,
and property damage) but incorrectly perceive these as long-term
implications rather than relevant to present day decisions.72 World
leaders recognized the catastrophic effects of climate change that
could occur within this century when nearly 200 countries signed
the Paris Agreement in December 2015, agreeing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to accelerate the transition to a lowercarbon economy.73 Parties to the Paris Agreement agreed to hold
the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius
above pre-industrial levels with a goal to limit the increase to 1.5
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.74 Although the U.S. began the process to withdraw from the Paris Agreement,75 no other
69 See H.R. 3623, 116th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3623 [https://perma.cc/UZ6M-QYZC] (providing tracking information for the bill).
70 Compare S. 2075, 116th Cong., with S. 3481, 115th Cong.
71 Arian Campo-Flores, Some Republican Lawmakers Break With Party on
Climate Change, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/somerepublican-lawmakers-break-with-party-on-climate-change-11560337010
[https://perma.cc/G2CV-3CT5].
72 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at ii.
73 Id. at 1.
74 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015 T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
75 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-fromthe-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/Z4EJ-HEQT]; see also Climate Change:
China Vows to Defend Paris Agreement, BBC (May 9, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39861589 [https://perma.cc/WK7U262Q].
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countries have withdrawn, and those countries continue to express
their support of adhering to the 2 degrees Celsius Scenario and the
transition to a low-carbon economy.76 Despite this extraordinary
agreement, the IPCC issued a new report in October 2018, finding
that, at current greenhouse gas emission rates, warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels will occur between 2030
and 2052.77 The report determined that the world economy will
have to transform within just a few years to avoid the most serious
damage, which they estimate would cost $54 trillion.78
Following the IPCC report, in November 2018, the U.S. Global
Change Research Program released a report highlighting the economic damage that the U.S. is vulnerable to by the end of this century because of the impacts of climate change.79 The report focuses
on detrimental impacts to numerous sectors, including: (1) communities, (2) the economy, (3) water quality and availability, (4)
health, (5) indigenous peoples, (6) ecosystems and ecosystem services, (7) agriculture, (8) infrastructure, (9) oceans and coasts, and
(10) tourism and recreation.80 The report also states that without
substantial efforts to combat climate change, America’s economic
growth will be hindered.81 There will be disruptions to labor
productivity, power generation (through reduced generation efficiency and increased energy demand), and overseas operations and

76 Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/BH2G-JD96]; Macron
Defends Iran Deal, Paris Climate Accord at UN General Assembly, FRANCE 24
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.france24.com/en/20170919-french-president-macron-response-trump-un-general-assembly-iran-deal-climate
[https://perma.cc/56DM-QCHZ] (noting that Macron refuses to renegotiate the
Paris Agreement). But see Emily Schultheis, German Parties Agree to Drop 2020
Climate Goal: Report, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/report-german-parties-agree-to-drop-2020-climate-goal/
[https://perma.cc/ZYS34GM2].
77 IPCC REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
78 Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis
as Early as 2040, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html
[https://perma.cc/A7K7-A564].
79 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
VOLUME II: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Reidmiller,
D.R. et al. eds., 2018).
80 Id. at 25–32.
81 Id. at 25.
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supply chains.82 Losses in some economic sectors are projected to
reach hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century.83
Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock—the world’s largest
money-management firm84—in his 2020 annual letter to CEOs,
simply stated how climate risk will impact the global system that
finances economic growth:
Will cities, for example, be able to afford their infrastructure needs
as climate risk reshapes the market for municipal bonds? What
will happen to the 30-year mortgage – a key building block of finance – if lenders can’t estimate the impact of climate risk over
such a long timeline, and if there is no viable market for flood or
fire insurance in impacted areas? What happens to inflation, and
in turn interest rates, if the cost of food climbs from drought and
flooding? How can we model economic growth if emerging markets
see their productivity decline due to extreme heat and other climate impacts?85

Although climate change and the transition to a low-carbon
economy pose significant financial risks, there are also opportunities that are relevant both near-term and in the future.86 As the
world transitions away from fossil fuels and its related physical
assets, there is a significant risk to organizations not prepared to
handle such a change.87 New opportunities will arise from this
transition because of the annual $1 trillion worth of investments it
is expected to require for the foreseeable future.88 Those organizations focused on climate change mitigation and adaptation

Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
84 In 2019, Blackrock was the world’s largest asset manager with $6.52 trillion in AUM. See M. Szmigiera, Largest Asset Management Companies Worldwide
as of March 2019, by Managed Assets, STATISTA (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/431790/leading-asset-management-companies-worldwide-byassets/ [https://perma.cc/DAZ8-J33G]. At the beginning of 2020, BlackRock has
increased its total assets under management to $7.4 trillion AUM. Blackrock Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 16, 2020).
85 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8.
86 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at ii.
87 Id.
88 Id. (citing INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL
BRIEFING FOR COP21 4 (2015)).
82
83
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solutions are presented with significant opportunities for investments.89
B. The Role of Institutional Investors in the Shift to a
Low-Carbon Economy
Although government has the most important role to play in
the transition, investors also have a very important role.90 Increasingly, investor groups have become vocal about the financial impacts of climate change as they begin to realize the seriousness of
the situation. In December 2018, a group of 415 investors overseeing $32 trillion in assets signed a letter asking governments to
make changes that could slow further climate change.91 The group
believes that climate change will cause permanent economic damage that is up to four times the scale of the impacts of the 2008
Global Financial Crisis.92
With this growing awareness of the significant economic impact of climate change, banks have begun to change their lending
practices. For example, five international banks have vowed to
align their corporate lending practices with the Paris Agreement’s
2 degrees Celsius goal and have taken steps to lessen their exposure to financial losses caused by climate change.93 Institutional
investors, utilizing the power of the capital they control, can assist
in the transition to a low-carbon economy by investing in renewable energy projects, as well as divesting from fossil fuel projects.
For example, HSBC pledged to invest $329 million into renewable

Id.; see also Alice Ross, Tackling Climate Change – an Investor’s Guide, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fa7a4400-d940-11e9-8f9b77216ebe1f17 [https://perma.cc/A9E5-6K4W].
90 See Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8.
91 See generally IIGCC, 2018 GLOB. INV’R STATEMENT TO GOV’TS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2018), https://www.iigcc.org/download/global-investor-statement-to-governments-on-climate-change/?wpdmdl=1826&refresh=5eab3c6ea63c11588280430 [https://perma.cc/N73T-S4DG].
92 At COP24: Group of 415 Investors Call on World Leaders to Address Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.unepfi.org/news/industries/investment/the-largest-ever-investorstatement-to-governments/ [https://perma.cc/5U45-DKBV].
93 Banks Join ING in Aligning Loan Portfolios to Fight Climate Change, ING
WHOLESALE BANKING, https://www.ingwb.com/insights/news/2018/banks-join-ingin-aligning-loan-portfolios-to-fight-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/7H48PNYY].
89
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energy infrastructure for wind and solar.94 Citigroup Inc. (“Citi”)
has vowed to phase out support to the coal industry to accelerate
the shift to a low-carbon economy.95 Additionally, the Dutch bank
ING Group plans to analyze how a company’s efforts against climate change will impact its debt payment ability.96 The bank will
also evaluate how companies perform and whether they are meeting the targets of the Paris Agreement.97
Banks have also begun to use various other mechanisms to address climate change and sustainability. One mechanism is a green
mortgage. Almost 40 European banks are testing this new type of
mortgage under which borrowers are required to have their properties meet certain energy efficiency standards.98 Discounted mortgages will also be offered to customers who spend extra on new
buildings or property upgrades that save power or natural gas
costs.99 Another mechanism is “sustainable improvement loans,”
which ING has been offering to companies.100 Companies receive a
higher credit rating if targets are met.101 A third mechanism is
green bonds, a mechanism which Citi will use to fund renewable
energy and conservation efforts.102
94 Jeremy Hodges, HSBC Pledges $329 Million Investment in British Green
Energy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2018/10/16/hsbc-pension-pledges-329-million-investment-in-greenenergy/#gref [https://perma.cc/G64G-SPNG].
95 Dan Ennis, Citi Pledges to Stop Thermal Coal-Mining Financing by 2030,
BANKING DIVE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.bankingdive.com/news/citibankpledge-stop-thermal-coal-mining-financing/576451/
[https://perma.cc/C5HGK77E].
96 Emily Chasan, ING Eyes How Companies It Lends to Will Weather Climate
Change, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Sept. 14, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/ing-eyeshowcompanies-it-lends-to-willweather-climate-change [https://perma.cc/6UYE-KJMG].
97 Id.
98 Matthew Carr, Green Mortgages on Tap from Banks Funding Climate Investment, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2018,), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-24/green-mortgages-on-tap-from-banks-funding-climate-investment
[https://perma.cc/6BA6-CZWQ].
99 Id.
100 Chasan, supra note 96.
101 Id.
102 Darcy Reddan, Citi Issues €1B Inaugural Green Bond to Fund Enviro
Goals, LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/environmental/articles/1120840/citi-issues-1b-inaugural-green-bond-to-fund-envirogoals?nl_pk=41832e84-4975-4bd1-af11-63f9f82f62b4&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=environmental.
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Banks are also embarking on broader campaigns to combat climate change. For example, in 2015, Citi announced a $100 billion
environmental finance goal over ten years to help accelerate the
global transition to a low-carbon economy,103 but is planning to
reach that goal four years early.104 Citi also became the first major
U.S. bank to support the of United Nation Principles for Responsible Banking.105 In these principles, banks commit to strategically
align their business with the goals of the Paris Agreement and the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.106 Banks collectively worth $47 trillion in assets have already signed up.107 Lastly,
in one of the most significant efforts so far, BlackRock announced
at the beginning of 2020 that it would place sustainability at the
center of its investment approach by exiting investments in thermal coal producers and releasing disclosures aligned with the
TCFD Recommendations.108 These examples demonstrate how financial institutions can play a key role in the reallocation of capital
to steer the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Id.
Jennifer Surane, Citi to Reach $100 Billion Environmental Goal Four
Years Early, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-03/citi-to-reach-100-billion-environmental-goal-four-years-early
[https://perma.cc/6NWA-Y5WH].
105 Id.
106 Banks Worth $47 Trillion Adopt New UN-backed Climate, Sustainability
Principles,
UN
NEWS
(Sept.
22,
2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046982 [https://perma.cc/S5VS-Q4S4].
107 Id.
108 See Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8.
103
104
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OVERVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY
THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD)
A. What is the TCFD?

In April 2015, the Group of 20 (“G20”) Finance Ministers109 requested that the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”)110 “convene
public- and private-sector participants to review how the financial
sector can take account of climate-related issues.”111 In December
2015, the FSB responded by establishing the TCFD – chaired by
Michael Bloomberg – to develop a voluntary climate-related disclosure framework that those in the business and financial industry
can use to better understand material risks.112 Through consulting
with global leaders in business and finance, the TCFD was to create recommendations that would assist companies’ understanding
of what climate-related information is sought after by investors so
companies can align their disclosures with those investor needs.113
By December 2016, after soliciting input and comments from the
public and from business and financial leaders, the TCFD released
its Draft Report of the Recommendations.114 After the release of
the Draft Report, the TCFD conducted another consultation to

109 The G20 consists of the Finance Ministers (US equivalent: Secretary of
the Treasury) and Central Bank Governors (US equivalent: Chairman of the Federal Reserve) from the twenty largest economies in the world who gather periodically to discuss financial and socioeconomic issues. About the G20, G20,
https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/whatis.aspx [https://perma.cc/B8RM-7RAK].
110 “The [FSB] is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system.” About the FSB, FSB,
https://www.fsb.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/4GLQ-Y4C9].
111 G20, COMMUNIQUÉ – G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK
GOVERNORS MEETING 5 (Apr. 16-17, 2015), http://www.g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/April-G20-FMCBG-Communique-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3K65-K9X5].
112 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at iii; see also About the Task
Force, TCFD, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/# [https://perma.cc/SGF8-UPSC].
113 About the Task Force, supra note 112.
114 TCFD, DRAFT REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/16_1221_TCFD_Report_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB25W7GD].
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gather feedback on its initial recommendations.115 The TCFD released its Final Report in June 2017.116
B. TCFD Recommendations
The TCFD created the Recommendations in a manner such
that all organizations can align their financial disclosures with
them and that they can provide organizations with decision-useful
information relating to the financial risks and opportunities of the
low-carbon transition.117 Although voluntary, the TCFD created
the Recommendations to be “ambitious, but also practical for nearterm adoption,” and “expects that reporting of climate-related risks
and opportunities will evolve over time as organizations, investors,
and others contribute to the quality and consistency of the information disclosed.”118
The TCFD Recommendations address four core elements of climate-related financial disclosures: (1) governance (“[t]he organization’s governance around climate-related risks and opportunities”);
(2) strategy (“[t]he actual and potential impacts of climate-related
risks and opportunities on the organization’s businesses, strategy,
and financial planning”); (3) risk management (“[t]he processes
used by the organization to identify, assess, and manage climaterelated risks”); and (4) metrics and targets (“[t]he metrics and targets used to assess and manage relevant climate-related risks and
opportunities”).119 For purposes of analyzing climate-related risks
under these elements, the Recommendations categorizes risks into
transition risks120 and physical risks.121 When analyzing climaterelated opportunities, the opportunities are categorized into five
types: resource efficiency, energy source, products and services,
markets, and resilience.122

TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 48.
Id. at i.
117 Id. at iii fig.1.
118 Id. at 3.
119 Id. at iv–v fig.2.
120 Transition risks include law, technology, market, and reputation. Id. at 10
tbl.1.
121 Physical risks include those classified as acute (“[i]ncreased severity of
extreme weather events”) and chronic (rising temperatures and sea levels, extreme weather pattern variability, and changes in precipitation patterns). Id.
122 Id. at 11 tbl.2.
115
116
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Aside from the four core elements, there are various other recommended guidelines. A main focus of the Recommendations, in
order to foster broader use of climate-related financial disclosures,
is to include them in annual public financial filings123 with adherence to seven principles for effective disclosures.124 In addition to
adhering to the seven principles, the Task Force also recommends
that companies implement scenario analysis125 to test the resilience of an organization’s strategy against different climate-related
scenarios.126 Lastly, the TCFD also provides supplemental guidance to the financial sector127 and to the non-financial sector.128
According to the TCFD 2019 Status Update, the TCFD Recommendations have gained support from various governments, numerous multinational corporations, financial institutions, accounting boards, insurance companies, and pension funds.129 As of
December 2019, 930 organizations have expressed their support
for the TCFD Recommendations,130 including fourteen of the
world’s top fifteen largest institutional investors.131 Ernst & Young
(“EY”) created a guide for businesses on how to implement the
TCFD Recommendations and found there are benefits to both
Id. at iv.
Disclosures should be representative of relevant information; specific and
complete; clear, balanced, and understandable; consistent over time; comparable
among companies within a sector, industry, or portfolio; reliable, verifiable, and
objective; provided on a timely basis; and should represent relevant information.
Id. at 18 fig.6.
125 Scenario analysis is a useful tool for considering effects on future performance because it is a process that analyzes alternative possible future outcomes.
GLOB. INV’R COAL. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS OF OIL AND GAS
COMPANIES: TRANSITION TO A LOWER CARBON FUTURE 6 (2016),
http://www.iigcc.org/files/publicationfiles/IIGCC_2016_Oil_and_Gas_report_v17_WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/UG2Y8E35]. Scenario analysis is also intended to be used as a “business tool to stress
test the resilience of a company’s strategy and portfolio.” AHMAD, supra note 41,
at 18.
126 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at v.
127 The financial sector includes banks, insurance companies, asset owners,
and asset managers. Id. at 15.
128 The non-financial sector includes energy; transportation; materials and
buildings; and agriculture, food, and forest products. Id.
129 See 2019 STATUS REPORT, supra note 11, at 110–16.
130 TCFD Supporters, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES,
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/R7A6-H6HH] [hereinafter TCFD Supporters].
131 Szmigiera, supra note 84 (listing largest asset management companies);
see also TCFD Supporters, supra note 130.
123
124
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investors and businesses who opt do so.132 These benefits include
improved risk management; familiarization with scenario analysis; consistent external communication; a shift of focus of external
stakeholders towards forward looking assumptions, methodologies, opportunities, and strategies; as well as an increased awareness of directors’ fiduciary duty,133 which the Business Roundtable
recently stated applies to all stakeholders.134
V.

WHY CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL
THUS FAR

A primary reason why the 2010 Climate Guidance failed to
make a significant impact on climate-related financial disclosures
is because the guidance is an interpretive rule rather than a legislative rule. Interpretive rules, a type of “guidance document” that
does not go through notice and comment rulemaking,135 “do not
have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight
in the adjudicatory process.”136 Guidance documents include interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.137 Interpretive rules are merely
an agency’s present interpretation of a statue and have no “power
to control,”138 and an “agency remains free in any particular case
to diverge from whatever outcome the policy statement or interpretive rule might suggest.”139 A legislative rule, on the other hand, is
binding policy, created through rulemaking that constitutes
132 EY, REPORTING CLIMATE CHANGE RISK 11 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-at-reporting-climate-change-risk-2017/$FILE/eyreporting-climate-change-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z84C-S5UZ].
133 Id.
134 See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purposeof-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/GG83-Q4A6].
135 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018).
136 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015) (quoting Shalala
v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
137 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); see Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 788 (2010).
138 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
139 Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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binding precedent and carries the force of law.140 The Second Circuit, in White v. Shalala, found that legislative rules are those that
create laws, rights, or duties, whereas interpretive rules are those
that clarify an existing statute or regulation.141 Although the SEC
interpreted that current securities laws require material risks
posed by climate change to be disclosed, the fact that it is an interpretive rule provides the SEC with the ability to diverge from and
not enforce its interpretation and leaves significant discretion to
management.
Despite the SEC not enforcing its interpretation, climate skeptics and industry advocates may argue that the 2010 Climate Guidance is really a legislative rule disguised as an interpretive rule –
hoping to entirely eliminate the “rule” for failure to go through notice and comment rulemaking– but that argument would most
likely fail.142 “[A] rule has such force only if Congress has delegated
legislative power to the agency and if the agency intended to exercise that power in promulgating the rule.”143 American Mining
Congress v. Mine Safety and Health Administration provided three
instances where intent to exercise can be found, but these are also
red flags that a legislative rule is disguised as an interpretive rule:
(1) whether, in the absence of a legislative rule, the basis for agency
enforcement would be inadequate; (2) whether it was published in
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR); and (3) where an amendment conflicts with a legislative rule, the amendment must be legislative.144 The second instance, publication in the CFR, was
deemed to be not determinative alone by Health Insurance Association of America, Inc. v. Shalala.145 However, American Mining
Congress did not address whether the absence of a red flag is sufficient to show that a rule is not legislative.
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P. helped fill
this void.146 Paralyzed Veterans stated that a rule is more likely to
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303–04 (2d Cir. 1993).
142 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,
1110 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
143 Id. at 1109.
144 Id.
145 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
146 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), abrogated by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
575 U.S. 92 (2015). This case was abrogated on the grounds that, “[b]ecause an
agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial
140
141
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be an interpretive rule and therefore exempt from notice and comment rulemaking if its content: (1) is fairly encompassed within the
preexisting statute or legislative rule that it purports to construe;
(2) it is tightly drawn linguistically from the actual language of the
preexisting rule; or (3) is not distinct or additive to the preexisting
regulation or statute.147 Typically, the more tethered the interpretive rule is to the language of the statute or legislative rule, the
more likely the rule is an interpretation.
In considering the 2010 Climate Guidance, neither red flag is
raised. For the first red flag, Regulation S-K is the implementing
regulation, and the guidance document is interpreting Regulation
S-K. Without Regulation S-K, the SEC would not have an adequate
basis for enforcing the Guidance. For the second red flag, the 2010
Guidance is not an amendment to Regulation S-K and does not
purport to be an amendment. Filling in the American Mining Congress gaps with the factors from Paralyzed Veterans, it is quite
clear that the Guidance is an interpretive rule rather than a legislative rule. For the question of whether the content is “fairly encompassed” within Regulation S-K, the Guidance discusses what
Items of Regulations S-K may trigger disclosure of climate changerelated information in order to satisfy an issuers obligation to disclose “such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading.”148 This is “fairly encompassed” because the SEC is simply spelling out that issuers
have a duty to disclose climate-change information if it is deemed
material and that failure to disclose such information would make
the disclosure misleading. The second factor of the analysis is also
satisfied. After the Guidance explains what Items may trigger disclosure obligations,149 it then discusses how those Items can be applied to climate change-related issues.150 The applications are
interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures when it amends
or repeals that interpretive rule.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 101. It should be noted, however, that the Exchange Act and the Securities Act do not mandate that rule challenges be filed in the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court has infamously never
addressed the issue of whether a legislative rule can be disguised as an interpretive rule. Therefore, the Paralyzed Veterans analysis is not nationally binding on
challenges to SEC rules.
147 Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588.
148 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20 (2020).
149 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 12–20.
150 Id. at 22–27.
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“tightly drawn linguistically” because the Guidance is applying the
climate change-related issues to the specific language and purpose
of the Items. For example, Item 503(c) requires an issuer to disclose
non-generic risk factors which the Guidance then states could include pending litigation or legislation pertaining to climate
change.151 Lastly, the Guidance is not distinct or additive to Regulation S-K; rather, it finds that climate risks “could” or “may” trigger disclosure obligations, and that companies “should consider”
disclosing material risks.152 Because the 2010 Climate Guidance
cannot be seen as a legislative rule, it therefore provides no binding
effect on the SEC nor the regulated entities; it is simply the SEC’s
interpretation of existing disclosure obligations as it relates to material climate-related information.
VI.

RECOMMENDATION: IMPROVED
LEGISLATION REQUIRING MANDATORY
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES ALIGNED WITH THE TCFD
RECOMMENDATIONS

This Note suggests that passing an amended version of the
CRDA, requiring alignment with the TCFD Recommendations,
will hasten the U.S. path to a low-carbon economy. As a world
leader, the U.S. must lead by example and work with other G20
countries to adhere to the targets of the Paris Agreement. As seen
with the Kyoto Protocol, where other countries like the European
Union would only agree to an emissions trading system if the U.S.
would agree to join,153 the U.S. has an opportunity to make mandatory climate risk disclosure mainstream among developed nations. With global support of the Recommendations, the U.S., by
creating a mandatory reporting framework aligned with the TCFD
Recommendations, will encourage other countries to adopt the
same or substantially similar frameworks. With global uniformity
in the availability of information pertaining to climate-related
risks, investors will have the necessary information to make

Id. at 22.
See General Electric Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 381–85 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(discussing that non-mandatory language can help determine if a rule is interpretive rather than legislative).
153 See MICHAEL BLOWFIELD, BUSINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY 139 (2013).
151
152
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informed investments, allowing the global economy to transition to
a low-carbon economy faster.
A mandatory scheme is needed because voluntary frameworks, like those offered by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board, the Global
Reporting Initiative, and the International Integrated Reporting
Council, have not been adopted and implemented fast enough.154
The window to adopt and implement these frameworks is closing
quickly, but the implementation must occur in order to minimize
the financial risks from climate change.155 Many companies already disclose sustainability issues in voluntary reports, but have
been hesitant to disclose them in mandatory reports because of
their perceived litigation risk.156 Information in official filings are
of more use because the information “gets greater scrutiny, is subject to better internal controls and procedures, in reality poses no
legal risk,157 and is more credible to investors.”158 The litigation
risk that companies are concerned about pertains to scenario analysis being interpreted as a financial forecast; however, it is important for companies to understand that the TCFD is asking companies to “explain how their business might be affected under
different scenarios” rather than provide a financial forecast.159 A
mandatory framework should ease these concerns by requiring all
issuers to use scenario analysis for hypothetical futures.
A. New Legislation is Needed Rather than a New

154 2019 STATUS REPORT, supra note 11, at i (“[P]rogress must be accelerated.
Today’s disclosures remain far from the scale markets need to channel investment
to sustainable and resilient solutions, opportunities, and business models.”).
155 BANK OF ENGLAND, TRANSITION IN THINKING: THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE ON THE UK BANKING SECTOR 9 (2018), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/report/transition-in-thinking-the-impactof-climate-change-on-the-uk-banking-sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9GA-GWQK].
156 Robert G. Eccles & Michael P. Krzus, Why Companies Should Report Financial Risks From Climate Change, 59 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (2018),
http://ilp.mit.edu/media/news_articles/smr/2018/59312.pdf
[https://perma.cc/98AH-NQN9].
157 It is logical that companies would be subject to litigation risk by not including this relevant information in official reports rather than in voluntary reports because they would be subject to the litigation risk of failing to disclose material issues and misleading investors.
158 Eccles & Krzus, supra note 156.
159 Id.
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Regulation
Climate change is an extraordinary issue that requires bold
solutions. The solutions used to combat it must be used long
enough to promote meaningful change. A law requiring mandatory
climate-related financial disclosures is one such solution. Although
both congressional legislation and agency regulation carry the
force of law,160 congressional legislation is preferred. A regulation
for an issue of this importance is not as beneficial because of potential presidential influence cast upon the promulgation process.
Because the question of whether the SEC is truly an independent
agency has not been answered,161 it is a safer option to avoid the
uncertainty of presidential influence by enacting legislation rather
than a regulation.
Since the issuance of Executive Order 12,291,162 regulations
have been plagued with questionable presidential influence.163
This Executive Order required agencies to follow a set of policy
goals and mandates when proposing new regulations, which are
then reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”) prior to publication.164 Although it was later revoked by
Executive Order 12,866,165 its basic principles are still reflected in
the executive review process today.166 OIRA is tasked with ensuring that agency actions are consistent presidential policies and priorities.167 The intent of the review program was to restore integrity,
legitimacy, and transparency to the regulatory decision-making
process.168 Despite these efforts, the program has yet to achieve
these goals and is plagued by delays of agency actions,

See “force of law discussion” supra Part V.
See supra note 12 for a discussion on the issue of SEC independence.
162 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 472–76 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2018).
163 Peter Ketcham-Colwill, Presidential Influence Over Agency Rulemaking
Through Regulatory Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2014).
164 Id. at 1623–24.
165 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 822–27 (2018).
166 Ketcham-Colwill, supra note 163, at 1624.
167 Id.
168 Exec. Order No. 12,866, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 638.
160
161
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circumvention of disclosure and transparency requirements, and,
because of this circumvention, a lack of accountability.169
This influence has already been seen by the lack of SEC enforcement and the halted review of the Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosures Required by Regulation S-K.170 To
limit presidential influence and to avoid many of these executive
hurdles, legislation should be the vehicle used to introduce a law
requiring climate-related financial disclosures. Congressional legislation can require the SEC to promulgate more stringent regulations, therefore limiting the amount of presidential influence on
the regulatory review process.
B. Required Changes to the Climate Risk Disclosure
Act of 2019
As with most congressional legislation, the CRDA is vague,
providing the SEC with too much discretion when promulgating
regulations under the specified criteria and also leaving the SEC
vulnerable to influence by whomever is the head of the executive
branch. The CRDA is a step in the right direction, but it does not
require enough disclosure and does not set forth a uniform framework that provides investors with a full spectrum of quality information that will allow investors to make the profitable and necessary investments required for a swift transition to a low-carbon
economy. Without uniform standards, enforcement becomes more
difficult, causing companies to incur greater indirect costs like
maintaining separate record-keeping requirements for each jurisdiction they operate in.171 The new bill should require alignment
with the TCFD Recommendations to promote global uniformity in
disclosure requirements.
Appendix B of this Note lists where the CRDA is aligned with
the Recommendations (Appendix A provides a table that lists the
parts of the TCFD’s four core recommendation categories). Risk
Management is the only core recommendation category that the
CRDA aligns with; the CRDA fails to fully align with the other
three core recommendation categories. To start, the subsection of
See Ketcham-Colwill, supra note 163, at 1626–33.
Nowiski, supra note 52, at 7–8; see also Gelles, supra note 6.
171 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki & Katherine Fielder, The Neoliberal Turn in
Environmental Regulation, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 1, 40 (2016) (discussing the costs
associated with non-uniform eco-labels).
169
170
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the CRDA that discusses corporate governance only requires disclosure of the company’s practices surrounding climate-related
risks.172 To fully align with the Governance category of the Recommendations, the phrase “and opportunities” should be added to the
end of the sentence. The CRDA should also include language that
explicitly requires a discussion of the board’s oversight and management’s role in the corporate governance process pertaining to
climate-related risks and opportunities.
Next, the CRDA is not fully aligned with parts A and B of the
Recommendation’s Strategy category. Part A is not satisfied because the Act fails to require companies to “[d]escribe the climaterelated risks and opportunities the organization has identified over
the short, medium, and long term.”173 A similar requirement
should be added. Part B is only partially satisfied because the Act
only requires companies to identify and evaluate the financial impact of climate-related risks.174 In order to fully align with the
Strategy category, the Act must also include the identification and
evaluation of the financial impact of climate-related opportunities.
Lastly, the CRDA is only partially aligned with the Metrics
and Targets category of the Recommendations. Part B is only partially satisfied because, although the Act requires the disclosure of
direct and indirect GHG emissions, it does not specifically require
the use of the GHG Protocol.175 Use of the GHG Protocol should be
used to fully align with the Recommendations and also further promote the use of a standard framework. Part C is not satisfied because language must be added to require the issuer to discuss its
metrics and targets for factors like GHG emissions, water use, and
energy use.
The most important piece missing from the CRDA is the
identification of opportunities a company has during the transition
to a low-carbon economy. The current text of the CRDA only
172 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. § 5(a) (2019)
(adding Section (s)(2)(B) as a proposed amendment to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018)).
173 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 14.
174 S. 2075 § 5(a) (Section (s)(2)(a) of the proposed amendment to § 78m).
175 The GHG Protocol is a standardized corporate GHG accounting and reporting framework that termed Scope 1, 2, and 3 GHG emissions. See generally A
CORPORATE AND REPORTING STANDARD, THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL (2004),
https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MW72-NR94].
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mentions the word “opportunity” three times: once in the “Sense of
Congress” section, and twice in the “Findings” section, where the
language is qualified by the non-mandatory language “should.”176
No mention of opportunity is made in the two subsequent sections:
“Disclosures Relating to Climate Change” and “Rulemaking.”177
Opportunities are needed for full disclosure. The purpose of
climate risk disclosure is to assist in the swift transition to a lowcarbon economy and to provide investors with accurate information about the assets they are investing in. When making an
investment decision in the future low-carbon economy, knowing
what opportunities exist for a company is essential information for
an investor.178 Mercer indicates in its 2019 report that its clients
want to know how the market prices climate opportunities.179
The sole disclosure of risks solves only the first half of the transition to a low-carbon economy: divestment from fossil fuels. The
second half requires investment in renewables so that the technology and infrastructure needed for the low-carbon economy is perfected and in place. Thus, it is necessary for opportunities to be
disclosed by companies as well. Because the transition to a lowcarbon economy is inevitable,180 disclosure of climate-related opportunities will shift green investments away from stereotypical
activist investors, sustainable investors, socially responsible investors, etc., and towards mainstream investment. Mercer identifies
investment in to the 2 degrees Celsius Scenario as both an economic imperative and an opportunity.181 Investors who become opportunistic “can target investment in the many mitigation and adaptation solutions required for a transformative transition.”182
Therefore, the disclosure of these opportunities is necessary to capture investors who have not traditionally made green investments.
S. 2075 §§ 3(7), 4(1)–(2)(C).
Id. §§ 5, 6.
178 See MERCER, INVESTING IN A TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2019),
https://www.mercer.com/content/dam/
mercer/attachments/private/nurture-cycle/gl-2019-wealth-climate-change-the-sequel-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NLM-RHPU].
179 Id. at 9.
180 Helen Mountford, Can Low-Carbon Investments Help Economies Recover
from Coronavirus?, WORLD ECONOMIC F. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/coronavirus-low-carbon-investments-economies-recovery-climate-change [https://perma.cc/UFP9-U8JC].
181 MERCER, supra note 178, at 11.
182 Id. at 12.
176
177
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ALTERNATIVES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Although this Note recommends that new legislation be
passed, it is not necessarily the most feasible option because of the
difficulty in passing legislation, especially in today’s increasingly
polarized political climate. Alternatives within administrative law
exist that are more feasible in the short term. However, these options may not be feasible during the current Trump Administration
because of its pro-industry approach to environmental regulation.183
A. Use a More Forceful Interpretation of the Current
Law to Create a New Interpretive Rule
Although the 2010 Climate Guidance stated that disclosure of
material climate-related information is already required under
current securities law, the Guidance was not as forceful as it could
have been. Because the Guidance consistently uses the terms
“could,” “may,” and “should consider,” a significant amount of discretion is left to management in determining what climate-related
issues must be disclosed. In order to “remind parties of their existing duties,” the SEC can provide substantially more clarification
on what climate-related information is material and how it should
be disclosed.
A more forceful interpretation of Regulation S-K is required.
The 2010 Guidance only addresses four areas of Regulation S-K
where climate risk disclosure could be triggered: Item 101, “Description of Business”; Item 103, “Legal Proceedings”; Item 303,
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis”; and Item 503(c), “Risk
Factors.”184 Other Items of Regulation S-K trigger disclosure requirements if a more forceful interpretation is used. For example,
Item 102, “Description of Property,” requires a registrant to
“[s]tate briefly the location and general character of the principal
plants and other materially important physical properties of the
183 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 03, 2017) (“[I]t
is important that for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for elimination.”); see also Eric Lipton et al., The Real-Life Effects of Trump’s Environmental Rollbacks: 5 Takeaways from Our Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/us/trump-environment-regulation-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/8CMB-ESEB].
184 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 12–20.
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registrant and its subsidiaries.”185 Climate related disclosures under this Item include the vulnerability of a company’s property to
sea level rise or water scarcity, and also include the opportunity
for investments in adaptation and mitigation infrastructure. Item
304, “Changes in and Disagreements with Accountants on Accounting and Financial Disclosures,” requires the disclosure of, inter alia, disagreements between the registrant and the former accountant over the scope of financial statement disclosure.186
Climate-related disclosures are triggered if the former accountant
believed that the scope or fairness of the financial statement provided by management did not, based on the information available
to the accountant, account for all of the financial risks the company
is exposed to due to climate change.187 Item 305, “Quantitative and
Qualitative Disclosure of Market Risk,”188 triggers disclosure if the
market for oil and gas is disrupted. This Item also requires disclosure of how the company manages that market risk exposure (i.e.,
what are its objectives and general strategies).189 Item 308, “Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting,” requires management to
disclose the framework used for evaluating the effectiveness of its
internal controls over financial reporting, and the registrant cannot conclude that the controls are effective if “there are one or more
material weaknesses in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.”190 Almost all companies cannot conclude that their
internal controls over financial reporting are effective if they are
not reporting climate-related risks and opportunities or are only
providing vague or overly broad statements because these issues
are material.
A more forceful interpretation, then translated into a new interpretive rule, can more clearly and appropriately clarify and remind issuers of their duties under current securities law as it relates to material climate-related information. The SEC providing
a new interpretive rule is the quickest administrative action that
can be taken because it would not have to go through notice and

17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (2020).
Id. § 229.304(a)(1)(iv).
187 See id. § 229.304(a)(1)(v).
188 Id. § 229.305.
189 See id. § 229.305(b)(ii).
190 Id. § 229.308(a)(3).
185
186
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comment rulemaking.191 A new interpretation is appropriate for
two reasons: (1) global knowledge on climate science has significantly increased since 2010, and (2) management would have less
discretion when determining which climate-related impacts on
their company are material. New data about climate change is uncovered every day. The National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report in 2016 that defines the study
of climate change and its effect on an individual weather or climate
event as “event attribution.” The report states that “more and more
event attribution studies are being published every year,”192 and
this in part due to “the potential value of attribution for informing
choices about assessing and managing risk in guiding climate adaptation strategies.”193 A new interpretation that reflects the abundance of science discovered since 2010 will provide management
with the guidance they need for determining what information is
material, and thus disclosed, as to not be misleading to investors.
Although an interpretive rule is the weakest solution because it is
not binding law, it will still provide management with less discretion in determining what is material.194 An interpretive rule “reminds affected parties of existing duties,”195 so management will
have less grounds to argue that the information they failed to disclose was not material.
A more forceful interpretation, however, may run in to legal
concerns related to administrative law, primarily issues of deference. The Auer doctrine,196 recently upheld but limited in the process by Kisor v. Wilkie,197 instructs a court to defer to an agency’s
191

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018).

192 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, COMMITTEE

ON EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE ATTRIBUTION, ATTRIBUTION
OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2016).

Id. at 1.
An important comparison to note here is that a new interpretive rule
would limit management’s discretion, not the SEC’s enforcement discretion, so the
interpretive rule would not create a binding effect that would thereby classify the
rule as legislative. Cf. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (finding that a rule limiting enforcement discretion is deemed a legislative
rule rather than interpretive).
195 General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
196 Prior to its limitation, the Auer doctrine afforded deference to an agency’s
interpretation unless that interpretation was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
197 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
193
194
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interpretation of its own regulation after certain factors have been
met. First, “a court should not afford Auer deference unless the
regulation is genuinely ambiguous,” determined by exhausting all
the traditional tools of construction.198 Second, “[i]f genuine ambiguity remains . . . the agency’s reading must still be ‘reasonable.’”199
Third, the “court must make an independent inquiry into whether
the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to
controlling weight.”200 This is satisfied if the interpretation is made
as the agency’s “authoritative” or “official position” (i.e., made by
the head of the agency or the head’s chief advisors rather than a
mid-level official).201 Next, “the agency’s interpretation must in
some way implicate its substantive expertise.”202 Lastly, “an
agency’s reading of the rule must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment’ to receive Auer deference.”203 This means that it cannot be a
“convenient litigating position,” be a “post hoc rationalization advanced to defend past agency action,” or create “unfair surprise” to
regulated parties.204
On its face, a more forceful interpretation would have difficulty surviving the first factor. Is the term “material” genuinely
ambiguous after a court exhausts all traditional tools of construction? It is hard to say; the term “material” is vague, as well as the
term “reasonable investor” used in the Supreme Court’s and SEC’s
definitions.205 “The ‘reasonable investor’ is at best a shadowy figure, described only generically in judicial opinions and—in doctrine if not in practice—someone for the fact-finder to identify caseby-case.”206 Assuming, arguendo, that a court finds that the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, the new interpretation should have
no trouble passing the remaining four factors. The new interpretation is “reasonable” because it serves the purpose of protecting
Id. at 2415.
Id.
200 Id. at 2416.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 2417.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 2417–18 (internal quotations omitted).
205 See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
206 Amanda Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities Law, HARV.
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 13, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/13/the-reasonable-investor-of-federal-securities-law/
[https://perma.cc/9QLH-NHQS].
198
199

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4

34

2020]

FINANCING OUR FURTURE’S HEALTH

449

investors and falls in line with market trends and the approach of
other financial regulators around the world. The third factor is satisfied because this alternative will be issued as a new interpretive
rule, such that it is “authoritative” and the “official position” of the
SEC. A new interpretive rule may encounter some trouble when
applied to the “substantive experience” factor. On the one hand, a
more forceful interpretation may face challenges that, because the
SEC does not have the technical expertise to address issues of climate change, they should not be able to make such determinations.
Challengers may argue that the SEC, as an agency that deals with
securities and investor protection, is not the appropriate agency to
address issues of climate change. On the other hand, the SEC is an
agency that analyzes financial risks. Analyzing a climate-related
risk is just like analyzing the other risks that fall on the desks of
SEC staff, and, as Larry Fink said in his 2020 annual letter to
CEOs, “climate risk is investment risk.”207 The latter view lends
support that a new interpretive rule with a more forceful interpretation of Regulation S-K would be given Auer deference by a reviewing court. Lastly, this is not a “convenient litigating position”
or “post hoc rationalization advanced to defend past agency action”
because it is not in response to litigation or an agency action. It
also does not catch regulated parties off guard because the market
is clearly trending in the direction of requiring more climate-related disclosures.
B. Amend Regulation S-K
Another solution is to amend Regulation S-K—the regulation
that provides instructions for filing forms.208 The SEC took one step
towards this in 2016 when they issued the Concept Release, seeking public comments on whether the SEC should consider line-item
disclosure for sustainability issues, as well as materiality standards of sustainability factors.209 This alternative helps with the
confusion around what exactly needs to be disclosed and provides
less freedom to management to make those decisions. However, an

See Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8.
17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2020).
209 2016 Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,924.
207
208
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amendment to the regulation must go through notice and comment
rulemaking, which could take some time.210
The SEC would also have the opportunity to require alignment
with the TCFD Recommendations in the regulation. The different
parts of the TCFD Recommendations can be added as instructions
for what must be disclosed under certain paragraphs of various
Items under Regulation S-K. For example, the SEC includes instructions in Item 302, “Supplementary Financial Information,”211
providing disclosures recommended by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board.212 Alternatively, the SEC can add an additional
discussion section that requires analysis of climate-related issues,
similar to the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A).213
Amending Regulation S-K to include disclosure requirements
for climate-related risks and opportunities may cause challenges
based on Chevron deference.214 A Chevron analysis involves a
three-step test used when an agency rule interprets its substantive
statute. Step Zero allows a particular regulation to qualify for
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.215 Step One asks
whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue.216 If Congress
spoke directly to the issue, the court, as well as the agency, cannot
substitute its own interpretation for that of Congress.217 For Step
Two, if the court determines that Congress did not directly address
the precise question at issue, the court must decide whether the
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of

210 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018); see Am. Mining Cong.
v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
211 17 C.F.R § 229.302.
212 The FASB is the independent organization, designated by the SEC, that
publishes Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for use by public
companies.
About
the
FASB,
FIN.
ACCT.
STANDARDS
BOARD,
https://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/WN8W-ZH85].
213 See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO.
L.J. 923, 956–58 (2019) (proposing a “Sustainability Discussion & Analysis”
(SD&A) section of the annual report).
214 Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
215 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
216 Chevron, 837 U.S. at 842.
217 Id. at 842–43.
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the statute.”218 If the agency interpretation is reasonable, the court
cannot substitute its own for that of the agency.219
Step Zero is satisfied because the Securities Act expressly
states that “[t]he Commission shall adopt regulations under this
subsection requiring each issuer of an asset-backed security to disclose, for each tranche or class of security, information regarding
the assets backing that security.”220 The amended regulation will
also satisfy Step One because Congress, through the Securities Act,
did not speak to the issue; rather Congress gave the SEC full authority to determine what information must be disclosed. The
amended regulation encounters trouble under Step Two: whether
the SEC’s interpretation is reasonable and a permissible construction of the Securities Act. Interpreting the Securities Act to allow
the SEC to require disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities is entirely permissible because of the broad discretion Congress gave the SEC in determining what information must be disclosed. Challengers of this construction of the statute can bring
weak arguments that the 1933 Congress did not intend, and could
not have foreseen, the Securities Act encompassing uncertain risks
like climate change. However, the 1933 Congress “recognized that
investors must have access to accurate information important to
making investment decisions. . . .”221 Just as the 1933 Congress left
broad discretion to the SEC to determine what information must
be disclosed, using the phrase “accurate information” similarly
supports a broad interpretation of the statute. Disclosure of climate-related risks is necessary to provide investors with accurate
information and is permissible under a broad interpretation of the
intent of the Securities Act.
C. Promulgate a New Regulation
Another option is for the SEC to promulgate a new regulation
pursuant to the Securities Act222 that deals solely with climate-related risks and opportunities. This solution will also take some
time because it must go through notice and comment
Id. at 843.
Id.
220 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(1) (2018).
221 2016 Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,921.
222 15 U.S.C. § 77s.
218
219

37

452

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

rulemaking.223 This regulation would be an in-depth framework
aligned with the TCFD Recommendations. Just as the Concept Release was looking to do, a new regulation should also provide unambiguous materiality standards for climate-related risks and opportunities. The standards would provide management with less
discretion and would provide investors with better opportunities to
bring derivative lawsuits and the SEC with more power to bring
enforcement actions.224
Promulgating a regulation that deals solely with climate-related risks and opportunities may also encounter challenges based
on Chevron.225 The arguments against this administrative alternative are virtually the same as the arguments against amending
Regulation S-K. Steps Zero and One are satisfied because Congress, in the Securities Act, expressly gave the SEC full discretion
to determine what information must be disclosed. By giving the
SEC full authority, Congress did not speak to the issue and the
analysis can proceed to Chevron Step Two. Under Step Two, interpreting the delegation provision of the Securities Act to allow the
SEC to require climate-related disclosures is entirely permissible
under a broad interpretation of the intent of the Securities Act because it will provide investors with accurate information.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The era of relying on voluntary disclosure programs with limited government oversight must come to an end. Full disclosure—
of both climate-related risks and opportunities—is essential to
providing investors with the necessary information required to finance our future’s health, and to ensure a swift transition to a lowcarbon economy. Regulations that require the disclosure of a more
complete set of information help cure the market inefficiencies
caused by distorted and imperfect information.226 The current lack
of information surrounding climate-related risks and opportunities

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
“A suit brought by shareholders on behalf of a corporation to enforce corporate rights against directors or other insiders, or to assert rights of the corporation in the absence of corporate action to protect such rights.” Derivative Suit,
BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF FIN. & INV. TERMS (10th ed. 2018).
225 Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
226 Czarnezki & Fiedler, supra note 171, at 36–37.
223
224
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is one such inefficiency; however, a mandatory reporting framework will help correct this inefficiency.
Passing legislation that aligns mandatory reporting with the
TCFD Recommendations will have the most beneficial national
and global impacts by promoting uniformity. It will cure the market inefficiencies caused by the lack of or incomplete information
and will allow investors to properly allocate capital in order to mitigate climate change’s physical and financial effects on the U.S.
Creating a mandatory disclosure framework will also allow U.S.
regulators to take control of climate-related disclosures for the U.S.
capital markets before other jurisdictions can impose disclosure regimes on U.S. issuers and investors. Regardless of what type of law
is chosen or what disclosure framework is used, a mandatory reporting scheme for climate-related risks and opportunities is
needed to prevent the most severe consequences of climate change,
and it is needed fast.
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IX.

APPENDIX A: TCFD RECOMMENDED
DISCLOSURES227

Governance

Strategy

(a) Describe
the board’s
oversight
of climaterelated
risks and
opportunities

(a) Describe the
climate-related risks
and opportunities the organization
has identified over the
short, medium, and
long term

(b) Describe
management’s
role in assessing
and managing climate-related risks
and opportunities

227

[Vol. 37

(b) Describe the
impact of climate-related
risks and opportunities
on the organization’s
businesses,
strategy, and
financial
planning

Risk
Management

Metrics and
Targets

(a) Describe the
organization’s processes for
identifying
and assessing
climate-related risks

(a) Disclose the
metrics used
by the organization to assess climaterelated risks
and opportunities in line
with its
strategy and
risk management process

(b) Describe the
organization’s processes for
managing climate-related
risks
(c) Describe how
processes for
identifying,
assessing,
and managing climaterelated risks
are integrated into
the organization’s overall
risk management

(b) Disclose
Scope 1,
Scope 2, and,
if appropriate, Scope 3
greenhouse
gas (GHG)
emissions,
and the related risks

TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 14.
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(c) Describe the
resilience of
the organization’s strategy, taking
into consideration different climaterelated scenarios, including a 2
degrees Celsius or lower
scenario

455

(c) Describe the
targets used
by the organization to
manage climate-related
risks and opportunities
and performance
against targets

41
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APPENDIX B: LANGUAGE IN THE CRDA OF
2019 THAT ALIGNS WITH THE TCFD
RECOMMENDATIONS

Governance

Strategy

There is one
subsection
that comes
close: “a description of
any established corporate governance processes
and structures
to identify, assess, and
manage climate-related
risks.”228

Part b) is partly
satisfied by: “the
identification of,
the evaluation of
potential financial
impacts of, and any
risk management
strategies relating
to–(i) physical risks
posed to the covered issuer by climate change; and
(ii) transition risks
posed to the covered issuer by climate change.”229

Risk
Management

Metrics and
Targets

Part a) is satisfied
by: “the identification of, the evaluation of potential financial impacts of,
and any risk management strategies
relating to–(i) physical risks posed to
the covered issuer
by climate change;
and (ii) transition
risks posed to the
covered issuer by
climate change,”232
and “a description
of any established
corporate governance processes and
structures to

Part a) is satisfied by: “require that a
covered issuer .
. . incorporate
into the disclosure . . . a discussion of the
short-, medium, and
long-term resilience of any
risk management strategy,
and the evolution of applicable risk metrics, of the
covered issuer
under each scenario...”236

identify, assess,
and manage climate-related
risks.”233

228 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S.2075, 116th Cong. § 5(a) (2019)
(Section (s)(2)(B) of the proposed amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018)). Section 5(a) of the CRDA proposes to add a Subsection (s) to Section 78m of the Exchange Act. The following citations to subsection (s) are in reference to this proposed amendment.
229 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(A)).
232 Id. § 5(a) (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(A)).
233 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(B)).
236 Id. § 6(a)(2)(A)(v).
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Part c) is satisfied
by: “a description of
the resilience of the
strategy of the covered issuer for addressing climate
risks, taking into
account different
climate scenarios,”230 and “consider, when preparing any qualitative
or quantitative risk
analysis statement
contained in the
disclosure– (i) a
baseline scenario
that includes physical impacts of climate change; (ii) a
well below 1.5 degrees scenario; and
(iii) any additional
climate analysis
scenario considered
appropriate by the
Commission, in
consultation with
the appropriate climate principals.”231

Part b) is also satisfied by “the identification of, the evaluation of potential
financial impacts
of, and any risk
management strategies relating to–(i)
physical risks
posed to the covered issuer by climate change; and
(ii) transition risks
posed to the covered issuer by climate change.”234

457

Parts b) and c)
are partly satisfied with requirements
that an issuer
disclose direct
and indirect
GHG emissions,237 as
well as water
withdrawal
and regional
scarcity.238

Part c) is satisfied
by: “a description of
how climate risk is
incorporated into
the overall risk
management strategy of the covered
issuer.”235

Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(D)).
Id. § 6(a)(2)(B).
234 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(A)).
235 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(E)).
237 Id. § 6(a)(1)(B).
238 Id. § 6(a)(2)(C)(ii)(V)–(VI).
230
231
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